课程信息
3,312

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中级

完成时间大约为15 小时

建议:6 weeks, 6-8 hours per week...

英语(English)

字幕:英语(English)

100% 在线

立即开始,按照自己的计划学习。

可灵活调整截止日期

根据您的日程表重置截止日期。

中级

完成时间大约为15 小时

建议:6 weeks, 6-8 hours per week...

英语(English)

字幕:英语(English)

教学大纲 - 您将从这门课程中学到什么

1
完成时间为 22 分钟

Introduction

...
1 个视频 (总计 2 分钟), 2 个阅读材料
1 个视频
2 个阅读材料
Course syllabus10分钟
Supplementary reading10分钟
完成时间为 2 小时

Government in a Market Economy

In this lecture we discuss reasons calling for government presence in market economies. We stress key advantages of markets over governments which make privately taken decisions highly efficient in the absence of externalities. The latter significantly distorts the work of market mechanism and lead to inefficient outcomes. We consider possible solutions to this inefficiency which are based either on coasean agreements or on public coercion (governements) and discuss conditions, advantages, and disadvantages related to these solutions....
5 个视频 (总计 89 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 1 个测验
5 个视频
1.2. Market failures and the Coase theorem24分钟
1.3. Collective action problem21分钟
1.4. Correcting externalities14分钟
1.5. Socially productive and unproductive activities15分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
1 个练习
Problem Set 120分钟
2
完成时间为 2 小时

Design of Government: A Tax Theory Primer

This lecture covers the positive and normative theories of taxation, ways and means to collect public revenues, and existing informational, administrative, political constraints governments have to deal with. We consider lump sum tax as first best option which implementation in practice, unfortunately, is severely restricted by informational asymmetry. Then follows a cursory introduction into one of the most beautiful (but also most technically complex) parts of public economics which characterizes optimal tax schedules minimizing welfare losses subject to information constraints; such analysis is carried out in the so-called Mirrlees economy. Another focal point of the lecture is the role of elasticity in selecting taxes and how the concept of elasticity can be applied to the analysis of time inconsistency in taxation....
7 个视频 (总计 100 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 1 个测验
7 个视频
2.2. Power and Limitations of Lump-Sum30分钟
2.3. Selecting Tax Schedule8分钟
2.4. Complexity vs. Simplicity12分钟
2.5. The Role of Elasiticity22分钟
2.6. Political Constraints4分钟
2.7. Protection from Leviathan6分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
1 个练习
Problem Set 220分钟
3
完成时间为 2 小时

Scope of Government

In this lecture we discuss how governments perform their key functions such as public regulation and public service delivery using three cases. In the first case, we discuss alternative means to control externalities by considering situations when private firms could cause harm to third parties (employees, customers, local communities etc.). These means include (a) imposing mandatory requirements upon firms to take precautionary measures, (b) allowing damaged parties to sue firms in the court of law, and (c) leaving such incidents to Coase-style private solutions. In the second case, we compare two modalities of public service delivery, namely in-house, by government agencies, or through outsourcing to private sector firms. Finally, we discuss the phenomenon of regulatory capture when wealthy elites unnecessarily complicate and obstruct the entry into the formal sector. ...
5 个视频 (总计 96 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 1 个测验
5 个视频
3.2. Controlling Externalities: Litigation vs. Regulation23分钟
3.3. The Role of Administrative Capacity16分钟
3.4. Outsourcing of Public Services31分钟
3.5. Regulatory Capture19分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
1 个练习
Problem Set 320分钟
4
完成时间为 2 小时

Politics of Public Economics

This lecture begins with an analysis of how public economic policies differ from each other in democracies and autocracies. We next turn to politics of public economics in democracies and begin with the classical result about non-existence of a universal rule of democratic aggregation of preferences (Arrow's impossibility theorem). Then introduce so-called single-peaked preferences and discuss the role of median voter in collective decision making. Another problem occurs in polarized societies where even economically optimal democratic choice leaves people far to the left and/or far to the right from the median quite unhappy with a majority will. Possible solutions include restricting democratic procedures to smaller and hopefully more homogenous groups and charging user fees for a public good. We discuss the costs and benefits of these two approaches....
6 个视频 (总计 95 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 1 个测验
6 个视频
4.2. "Invisible political hand"9分钟
4.3. Democracy and autocracy compared15分钟
4.4. Preference aggregation problem12分钟
4.5. Single-peaked preferences and majority rule23分钟
4.6. Public goods: jointly or separately?19分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
1 个练习
Problem Set 420分钟
5
完成时间为 2 小时

Working of the Government

In this lecture we discuss external and internal agency problems, i.e. relations between government (as an agent) and society (the principal) and between rank-and-file bureaucrats (the agents) and their bosses (the principals). We discuss ex ante and ex post accountability system in an external agency. Moving to the internal agency problem, we discuss how to create performance incentives within the bureaucracy including vertical monitoring and career concerns. The final episode of the lecture deals with selected topics of the economics of corruption....
5 个视频 (总计 81 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 1 个测验
5 个视频
5.2. External agency: accountability ex ante15分钟
5.3. Internal agency: limits to bureaucratic efficiency20分钟
5.4. Career concerns16分钟
5.5. Economics of corruption primer13分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
1 个练习
Problem Set 520分钟
6
完成时间为 2 小时

Government and Society

In this final lecture of the course we discuss the role of society in public sector economics. We start with the notion of social capital and show its duality: its substitutional and complementary relations to government. Our first illustration of the interplay between government and social capital is philanthropy. Then we demonstrate how dual role of social capital gives rise to the so-called “paradox of social capital”. Then we illustrate the salience of civic culture for good public sector governance by models linking government performance to what citizens expect from their governments. In the next part of the lecture, we show how communities can respond to a lack of government-supplied public goods and services by apolitical self-organization in order to substitute for what they haven’t received from the government. The final episode of the lecture explores the link between social capital and the size of government (public sector). ...
5 个视频 (总计 78 分钟), 1 个阅读材料, 2 个测验
5 个视频
6.2. Understanding Philanthropy9分钟
6.3. Role of Civic Culture31分钟
6.4. Let's Do It Ourselves?15分钟
6.5. Social Capital and Size of Government12分钟
1 个阅读材料
Syllabus10分钟
2 个练习
Problem Set 620分钟
Final Exam24分钟
4.7
12 个审阅Chevron Right

热门审阅

创建者 ATDec 12th 2018

This course is an exceptional.\n\nThanks for your offering.

讲师

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Leonid Polishchuk

Professor
Department of Applied Economics

关于 国立高等经济大学

National Research University - Higher School of Economics (HSE) is one of the top research universities in Russia. Established in 1992 to promote new research and teaching in economics and related disciplines, it now offers programs at all levels of university education across an extraordinary range of fields of study including business, sociology, cultural studies, philosophy, political science, international relations, law, Asian studies, media and communicamathematics, engineering, and more. Learn more on www.hse.ru...

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