[MUSIC] Now that the discussion is over, I'd like to summarize and point out what I think are the key elements that we raised in this discussion. The first question was, what international forces influence China's foreign policy today? And Bao Wei being the classic realist that he is, saw the international structure, which is hegemonic system with a dominant US, really affecting China's behavior. Because China always pays attention to the US, its activities, its views about China, and the US alliance structure in east Asia. The Chinese always see the US trying to constrain their rise, and they react to that. And part of that makes them cautious in using their own power, so that they don't directly challenge US interests. Nevertheless, simply by rising up, China is destabilizing the international power structure. Third, the global financial crises can really slow China's accumulation of national power by undermining its ability to get rich, to enrich itself, through export-led growth. And according to Richard, China is deeply influenced by the norms of the international organizations and the regimes that exist. But they also try and shape the rules and those institutions, for example, through organizations such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, what we refer to as the AIIB. [MUSIC] Second question was what principles underly Chinese foreign policy and has Xi replaced previous principles with a new set of his own principles? New leaders make a big difference in a state's foreign policy and everybody agreed that Xi has dramatically altered China's foreign policy rhetoric. And overall, has moved away from Dung's strategy of quote, laying low, and hiding one's capabilities. Xi believes that China's capabilities now allow it to assert its foreign interest. Richard emphasized that Xi has stressed the importance of China's bottom line and core interests. And that when it sees other states challenge its sovereignty or those interests, it will use its power to defend that. Previously it might not have done that. Still, China's current assertiveness predates Xi's ascension to the top of this CCP hierarchy, suggesting that there's more at work here then just the views of a new leader. We then talked about the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy, and this was really the most hotly debated issue that I think we had. Because Bao Wei believes that great power foreign policy is determined by its core objectives, which is to enhance the power of the state, and therefore, the international structure and each state's need to expand its power. That drives its foreign policy, and not its domestic politics, right? So, JP really believes that much of China's foreign policy is determined by its domestic system, so that if China were to move away from a one party state and become more democratic, then Chinese foreign policy would change as well. And he also believes that public opinion has an impact. Richard believes that foreign policy is the continuation of domestic politics. And he emphasized the rise of nationalism, focusing on two kinds of nationalism, one is state sponsored and the other is popular nationalism. And he believes that popular nationalism has been driving this issue. Now let me just say, that Bao Wei, at that point, came back in and said that China has managed domestic interest, or domestic opinion, public opinion. And if you look at many of its policies, such as the continuation of discussions with the Japanese, that may not be popular in China, but Xi has been able to push that point. China's impact on the world economy, Bao Wei saw China as the world's largest economy in terms of the World Bank's concept of purchasing power parity. And therefore, is having an enormous impact on the global economy. What he says is really, quote, reshaping the global order. JP saw China promoting the development of the bricks. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, and the developing economies all around the world. Its economic growth has created what he sees actually as a multi-polar world. The end of the US dominance as the center of the global economy moves, quote, from the West to the rest. Richard emphasized the sheer size of the Chinese economy from the supply side, particularly in terms of cash, how much money it has. China has $4 trillion in foreign reserves and is investing that money. For example, giving $5 billion in foreign aid, more than the World Bank, and its funding south-to-south cooperation. Finally, I brought us back to the point that, yes, it's true that China's economy is so influential. But that means that mistakes like the stock market, problems or slowdowns in China's economy can have enormous impact on the world. [MUSIC] Why is China surprised when other states in the region balance against it, or bandwagon with the US when it rises? I mentioned that China, I remember a seminar where a Chinese official had insisted that everybody knows that China has a peaceful foreign policy, when in fact, most of China's neighbors today see the opposite. So why is it that China is not more cautious in its behavior, and not more understanding of how its rise fuels the security dilemma for states in the region? Bao Wei believes that China is aware of this problem and knows that its rise has triggered fear, but there's not a lot it can do. Its rise has really intensified other states' security dilemma and that's the basis of a realist perspective. Richard wondered how the international system, the international society, sees new rising power. And that we can look at many of the Pew surveys and see how they're responding, and that does believe that China needs to work very hard to make the world feel more comfortable about its rise. JP took a tough line on this one. JP really borrowing that idea from Luttwak, said that China seems to suffer from what Luttwak calls great power autism. The fact that China somehow is autistic, it just doesn't hear, it just doesn't listen. And that it just doesn't care because, one reason being it had always been, as an empire, a great empire, at the top of the global hierarchy. And now it still feels that way, except that it recognizes and respects US power, and therefore it's willing to listen to the US. Still, we all agreed that China's military could do a little bit of a better job strengthening without threatening the states in Southeast Asia. The confrontation, is a confrontation, or even war between the US and China, inevitable? The team generally believed that China and the US will be able to avoid a war, right? Though we recognized that a mistake in the South China Sea, could be a disaster. Now, the reason there could be a war is because of the power transition theory, which is often referred to as the Thucydides trap. And Richard believed, however, that wise leadership, the recognition that there is that Thucydides trap, that leaders can learn from history and avoid war. Bao Wei agreed that China will work very hard to avoid war. But I think that that position, for him, really reflected the pride in his former home country's leadership. That they would be able to do that, as compared to his usual realist explanations, which should say that there could be a war. For me, I emphasis the fact that since the end of WWII, the states have not gone to war over territory. And that China's skill at fighting an economic war and using its economic power to enhanced its influence, suggests that military confrontation remains unlikely. Finally, JP even emphasized that in his view, that PLA Navy has been very cautious In terms of confronting the United States in the South China Sea. And has allowed the boats of the coastal forces to challenge the US, with the navy staying in the background and therefore avoiding any kind of serious confrontation. So I want to thank you all for your attention, for participating in this course, for just being here with us and I look forward to seeing you again in the future on Coursera.
