[MUSIC] There are at least two different ways of explaining the relationship between Ren and Li, between humanity and proper conduct, as we have seen in the last video segment. One interpretation sees Li as essential, and Ren as the spirit in which Li should be performed. The other interpretation, however, would see Ren as more basic, as the inner moral sense if you like of an individual, which ideally should permeate all actions. Li, on this view, then would be the correct form in which Ren finds expression in concrete social interaction. Now, both these interpretations are able to offer a coherent account of the relationship between Ren and Li. I think they will both find support from the Analects, but I think the two can be combined. The first interpretation emphasizes the constitutive power of Li, not only in regulating human behavior, but also more fundamentally in shaping human character. I think the second interpretation should not be dismissed entirely. We need not postulate an inner self, like a conscious moral soul, so to speak. But we may find a place for natural humane feelings in Confucius thinking, it seems to me, which can be a powerful agent in motivating proper conduct and moral action. These feelings may arise from kinship ties, as the Analects does indicate the filial piety and respect for elders might well constitute the very roots of Ren. Now, in a passage that I introduced in part in an earlier lecture, one of Confucius disciples argues that the Junzi gentlemen cultivates the roots. You have seen this. When the roots are established, the Dao or Way will grow. Now, the second part, shouldn't filial piety and respect for elders be recognized as the roots of Ren? Notice how the sentence is structured. Ren is identified as the fundamental ethical value that the Junzi must cultivate, in order for the Way or Virtue and harmony to grow. And Ren itself is traced to something even more fundamental, presumably, mainly filial affection and respect for elders especially for fraternal respect. If we think of Ren as love, or care, or compassion, or benevolence, the Analects seems to be saying that it begins at home with natural filial affection, nurtured by kinship in the way we relate to our parents and siblings and on that basis, it radiates outwards to an ever expanding network of relationships. From relatives, fellow clansmen, neighbours, friends, and society at large. I will come back to the concept of filial piety later, but at this point, I want to stay focused on the broader features of the ideal Junzi. We have Ren, the natural humane feelings that should ideally grow into a very strong sense of humanity. But is it the case that Ren is both necessary and sufficient to ensure the flourishing of the ethical life? Is love really all we need, so to speak? This seems to me to be a bit too strong. For while Ren is clearly necessary in the Confucian scheme of things, it does require Li to become complete as proper conduct. Just ask yourself this, would our natural feelings be a sufficient guide for proper conduct? Feelings may easily go beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior. Loving parents may end up over indulging their children, for example. For this reason, training in Li is vitally important to Confucian ethical cultivation. However, in any given situation, how do we determine what is the proper Li action? Usually, tradition, of course, would serve as the guide, and would provide practical norms. We seldom invent Li. We don't invent handshakes, we don't invent the ways we bow. Normally, we would follow what has been established, and passed down by tradition. Nevertheless, is tradition enough? We have seen that for Confucius, tradition cannot be the only guide. What was once accepted as the norm, such as wearing a linen cap for solemn occasions, might no longer be appropriate today, so something else is needed. This extra element is Yi, the Confucian sense of what is right. The word "Yi" is usually translated as rightness or righteousness. "The Junzi understands what is Yi." According to Confucius, "The petty or morally deficient person, in contrast, understands what is profitable." This passage from the Analects should suffice to show how important the concept is to understanding Confucian philosophy. It also contrasts Yi with the pursuit of profit, which I think should be read in the sense of self-interest in this instance. Now consider another passage where Confucius is reported to have said, "The Junzi is not dogmatic in his ways. He simply seeks to follow what is right." Admittedly, a more literal translation may read something like this. And the available English translations of this passage vary quite a bit. Be that as it may, I think you get the point that the Junzi is said to be concerned primarily with Rightness, or Yi. Should we perhaps consider Yi to be an abstract universal moral principle, like altruism, for example. Or should we treat it as something like utilitarianism? Which suggests that actions are to be judged, by whether it is able to bring the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people. This is the question that we will look at more carefully when we come back.
