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Lecture: What Causes Financial Crises? Part 1

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Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner and Professor Andrew Metrick survey the causes, events, policy responses, and aftermath of the recent global financial crisis.

您将学习的技能

Crisis, Global Financial Crisis, Financial Markets, Financial Crisis

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RA

Sep 01, 2018

This course was excellent. The short yet crisp lectures have given me a fair perspective of what came before, during and to an extent after the GFC. I feel I will greatly benefit from this knowledge.

KK

Jul 18, 2017

this cause has corrected some misconceptions that i had during my work as a bank examiner.. it will assist me in my current role as a risk manager of a significant important financial institution

从本节课中

The Common Causes of Financial Crises

Lecture: What Causes Financial Crises? Part 16:36

教学方

Andrew Metrick
Michael H. Jordan Professor of Finance and Management
Timothy Geithner
Lecturer in Management, Yale SOM, Former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

[MUSIC]

What causes financial crises?

Financial systems themselves are inherently fragile.

Financial distress in the financial system can cause severe damage to the real

economy, and policy makers often mismanage the response.

So let's start with a little bit about the basic structure of Financial Systems.

Financial Systems as you all know,

they play this critical function in the economy.

They take the savings of savers and loan or

invest those recourses in activity that has some positive return.

People lend them that money for a very short period,

they expect it to be available on demand.

And banks and other firms take those resources and

lend them for longer periods of time to support people who wanna borrow

to finance the purchase of a home or a business, that wanna build a new factory.

That's the basic function of the financial system.

The structure of a typical bank,

which is described here, has this thin base of common equity.

A set of other forms of borrowing, long and short, deposits, secured, unsecured.

And those finance the assets which are depicted on the left.

This basic structure, by design, is fundamentally fragile

because that equity cushion is thin and a large share of the remaining

source of funds used to finance the loans of the assets of the institution

can run, can be withdrawn in a crisis.

And a bank doesn't have the ability to sell assets quickly

to meet a withdrawal of funds in extremis,

thus, the inherent fragility of a financial system.

And I wanna show just a little illustration, so

I'm gonna pause one second and I'm gonna show you just a little illustration about

how to think about why to try to illustrate this basic point.

So you wanna think about banks as inherently tippy.

So a modest shock creates a risk that they can tip over,

and if you think about a system as a bunch of linked banks,

you see the obvious risk of them tipping over.

Ideally, you want banks to look more like this with this more stable foundation.

But the dilemma is people who trust their savings to a bank or lend money to a bank,

it's hard for them to tell whether the bank is stable like this or

whether the bank's vulnerable like this.

Particularly hard to tell in the midst of a deep recession

when the entire system's exposed to losses and

everybody's worried about the risks that they might lose their money.

So in a crisis, even banks that have this greater fundamental

foundation of stability, they look like this, they look vulnerable.

Here's a small illustration,

a simple illustration of the difference between a bank that has a more stable

base of capital, or more conservative funding structure, and one that doesn't.

That narrower base signifies a greater vulnerability to shocks,

greater fragility.

Now this matters in part because the financial system is so

closely linked with the rest of the economy.

It's like the power grid in the economy.

If the lights go out, the power system fails, it's very hard for

the rest of the economy to function.

One way to illustrate this linkage is by showing the way this basic dynamic works.

So let's think about it, just move through the cycle described here.

So economic growth slows because of some adverse shock, the economy slows.

That creates the fear of loses.

Depositors start to withdraw their funds from

what they perceive to be the weaker institutions.

Those institutions try to sell assets or withdraw loans,

call funding, to meet the demand for withdrawals of funds.

That pushes down asset prices, the price of financial securities.

In response to that, banks lend less.

They pull back.

That reinforces, intensifies the slowdown of the economy.

That makes more institutions look weaker.

The cycle continues.

It's a classic, vicious,

self-reinforcing cycle in the context of financial distress.

Third thing that matters is the response of policy makers to that shock or

that distress.

And as that earlier chart shows, policy makers tend to mismanage the response.

In fact, often the initial response, the initial inclination of policy makers

is to do things that makes the crisis worse.

Why is that, or how does that manifest?

Sometimes, it's just because policy makers just react too slowly, it's hard for

them to appreciate the magnitude of the crisis.

Sometimes, it's because they're understandably concerned about

moral hazard, about the effects on incentives about acting too aggressively.

Sometimes it's because of a basic conservatism in policy,

people think it's better to move slowly, you take less risk in doing that.

Sometimes its because of a basic lack of knowledge among policy makers about

what works, about what makes sense.

Because again, it's quite rare that the very severe crisis,

the classic panic, happens to the same country in a short period of time.

Usually these things are separated by long lags.

[MUSIC]

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