State has something particular: it is the only kind of political system, which is founded on rationality. The legitimacy of the state is coming from its special relation to rationality, all the other kinds of political systems are different, some of them are based on tradition, some others on charisma, but state is considered, first of all, as a rational expression of the political order. For this reason, state is supposed to be universal, for this reason, state must be extended in all the parts of the world, even if cultures, histories, social structures, are quite different from the western model. This exportation of the state model took place in America, toward America during the 19th century, and toward Africa and Asia with the decolonization process. If we take into account the American adventure, the process was rather successful for a very clear reason, the main culture in America, in North America, in South America is coming from Europe, and the main state builders in all the parts of America were trained as western leaders, and were really trained by the western culture they inherited. Now it’s quite different for the African and Asian case, for many reasons, and I would just point three reasons. The first is a question of temporality. Decolonization implies to build a political system, the independent political system, the sovereign political system, in a very short time. The time of decolonization is quite different from the time of state building in Europe. Keep in mind that the European, the western nation state was built according to a long process, which lasted several centuries, probably from the end of Middle Age to the 19th century. But Africa and Asia and in these continents, those countries which were decolonized didn’t have centuries for building their own political system, they didn’t have even some years, they had, I would say, some minutes, those minutes of the independence. The second reason, the second factor, is of course the western cultural hegemony, which was very important, clear, obvious, dense during the colonial period, but even also at the time of decolonization. That’s to say the only model that the leaders of independence had in mind was the Western model, and for a nationalist, an African nationalist or for an Arab nationalist, the political model that they had to implement was obviously the Western state model. The third reason is a reason of political hegemony, that’s to say to be admitted in the international arena in the second part of the 20th century – that’s to say the very moment of decolonization – implied to introduce itself as a state, as a formal state. If a new political system wanted to be admitted at the UN it had to present the main attributes of the classical, traditional, Western model of state. These reasons transform the state builders into importers, and this is probably one of the main features and the main ambiguities, even one of the main contradictions of decolonization. It’s a contradiction because a state builder was strongly nationalist, and, however, he had to build in his society, in his culture, a political system which was imitating the political system of the colonial power. This strong contradiction is probably at the basis of the process which took place during decolonization. These importers, were all of them socialized by the western culture, through Christian missions. And you know how Christianity in Africa contributed to socialize and after to train the new leaders like Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, in Tanganyika in this time, or for instance Fulbert Youlou in the French Congo, or the Baath nationalist leader Michel Aflak who was trained in the Christian school. So Christianity is an important agent of this importation. The second one is Western universities, that’s to say the main nationalist leaders went to Western universities for being trained. Nehru, the great Indian nationalist leader, was trained in Cambridge, or Kwame N’krumah who is considered as one of the main progressive and anti-western leader of Africa, and who was the first president of Ghana was trained in Lincoln University in the US. And this is probably one of the main bases of this contradiction, that’s to say, the nationalist ideology in Africa and in Asia was learnt in western universities and was shaped according to the main structures of meanings which are the characteristics of the western culture. The third agent was the western parliament, most of these leaders sitting in the French or British parliament, where they were trained like the Ivory Coast leader Houphouët-Boigny, who was even minister in the French government of the Fourth Republic, or Mamadou Dia and Léopold Sédar Senghor in Senegal and so on. And the fourth agent of socialization are the Western parties, socialist party, communist party, which played a very important role in socializing Sékou Touré in Guinea, Hô Chi Minh who was attending the congress of Tours in 1920 in which was created the French communist party, and we can add also Zhou Enlai or Deng Zhao Ping who were trained in France around this communist environment. These importers were triggering two kinds of importations, what I would called the conservative modernization and what I would called the revolutionary modernization. Conservative modernization is a way for keeping the throne for the traditional princes who were at power formally and informally during the colonial rule, and who try to save their throne and their crown by importing some elements of this western culture, for consolidating their power and for bearing this new independence. It’s the case of the Meiji Japan, it’s the case of the Ottoman Empire, which was westernized along the 19th century for reinforcing an Ottoman power which became more and more fragile, it’s the case of Persia, it’s the case of Siam, which was after Thailand, it’s the case of Burma and so on. And the revolutionary modernization is the same importation but not for consolidating traditional legitimacy, but for breaking with traditional legitimacy, and for building a state on the basis of a new legitimacy which was an imported one. And this is another paradox, that’s to say the revolutionary modernization implied the mobilization of the traditional elements of the Western culture for breaking with the traditional elements of the traditional order in Arab or African societies. It’s the case for instance of Nasser in Egypt, or the Baath party in Syria or in Iraq, or the FLN in Algeria and so on. Ladies and Gentlemen: I say the question, can these importations be successful? Is it possible to import a state as someone would import a plant, a factory of cars or of different kinds of economic activities? Of course not. This importation was widely a failure. It’s a failure because these imported institutions were not legitimate. It’s very difficult to conceive the legitimacy of a political order which is not generated from inside but which is imported from outside. That’s why, in the new states, in Africa or Asia and especially in the Arab world the civil society, and even the traditional civil society, appears nowadays as more legitimate than the political power, because the political power seems to import structures of meanings coming from abroad. And in these situations power is getting authoritarian, the less a power is legitimate, the more it is authoritarian. This is probably the main source of authoritarianism that we can find in newly independent countries. And for these reasons also, this power is affected by a strong extraversion, that’s to say why they are not legitimate inside, they have to look for outside some new resources, that’s why these new leaders are paradoxically more dependent on the powers, western powers or also eastern powers. This is also, as we will see later, one of the sources of collapsing states and of war societies that we can observe in Africa or in the Arab world or even in Asia. That’s why this contradiction between a state coming from abroad and a pressure coming from the local society is one of the main features of this new world and this new cleavage North versus South.
