As I said before, Russia sees not just opportunities but also threats and challenges in the world today. And these negative components of the Russian perception of the world is also a very profound determinant of Russian foreign policy. So, what do these negative component consist of? They consist of the following, the current domestic turmoil in the United States prevent any change of U.S. foreign policy towards Russia in a constructive way and impede US-Russian cooperation where it could really contribute to the interests of the sides. Under Trump, the United States is not systemically anti-Russian but very unpredictable. Moreover, it clearly prefers unilateralism, disregards international law, and has much less restraints on the use of force than under Obama. The United States under Donald Trump approaches the others from the position of strength and is physically unable to roll back and make concessions. Trump must look strong. And as a winner, he can't allow look weak. And this is very dangerous situation in the US-Russian relations. Then, the US traditionalist establishment and the elite is unwilling to reconcile with the new reality, with the necessity to adapt and is preparing for a post-Trump revenge. Russian attitudes towards them is best expressed by a familiar characterization of Bourbons after the restoration in France in 1815. They have learned nothing and forgotten nothing. The new ideological backlash in the United States is very likely after Trump, and this ideological backlash will aggravate, of course, US-Russian confrontation even more. The United States will return to the policy of regime change in general and towards Russia in particular, increase support of Ukraine, and so on, and so forth. And many Russian experts are seriously warned in 2016 that if Hillary Clinton had won, the US-Russian military direct, may direct military clash might become quite likely. So, this situation might return. New arms race and further military buildup in Europe is very probable and basically going on. NATO won't revise the Warsaw summit decisions and the United States won't refuse to deploy missile defenses in Poland and Romania. Russia will retaliate with its own military deployment. And here we go, we face the prospect of the new arms race in Europe. Next, there is a collapse of remaining nuclear arms control. It is not excluded that the INF, the Intermediate Range Missile Treaty is under question. The new Star Treaty might fall as well especially if the United States accelerates strategic missile defense policy. The European Union is unable to reject its previous paradigm according to which it is the EU is and should be the only pole of integration in wider Europe, and all their other European countries including Russia should be kind of concentric circles around the EU. The EU is unable to recognize Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union as the second pole of integration in wider Europe. Middle East is just in the beginning of profound destabilization and the problems there will not end with the destruction of the Islamic State. Russia is declining. Economically, It is not booming and stagnating. Its technological backwardness is increasing, and demographic situation in Russia is bad and sanctions are to stay for the next years to come for sure. And for instance, Crimea related sanctions will might stay for at least several decades. So, what kind of conclusions can we draw from this description. We can say that on the one hand, there is no need for Russia to change the fundamentals of its foreign policy such as refusal to perceived participation in the Western orbit or maintaining friendly relations with the West as necessary preconditions for its great power status. Western-Centrism in Russian foreign policy is indeed over. Russia will continue its strategic focus on Eurasia and continue struggling with the West for international order, recognition of its great power status in terms of relations being more important than their mood, in terms of relations, will be more important than their mood. Thus, relations with the West will remain transactional and largely confrontational and surely unfriendly. Secondly, Russia feels itself as the right side of history. There is no sense at all in Moscow that Russia is losing. Instead, there are reasons to argue that Russia is actually prevailing at least selectively and the successes of Russia's operation in Syria is the clear manifestation of this Russia's prevailing. Russia does not consider its foreign policy to be outdated. Instead, in the Russian perception, Russian foreign policy is actually reflecting the emerging rule and victory and many policies of Donald Trump are the latest manifestation to it. So, in the Russian perception that is actually the EU which is the big exception in the current international system, not Russia, and the current international system is getting more and more realist. But, on the other hand, we can make a conclusion that Russia needs to prepare for a long term period of unfriendly and even adversarial relations with the West and quite likely for a further aggravation of this confrontation up to a direct military threat. Domestic situation in the United States prevents using the opportunity that emerge with the Donald Trump administration to overcome the US-Russian confrontation. And after Trump, whether he leaves in 2020 or before, it is likely to become much worse. Thus, Russia makes a conclusion that it needs to invest in military, in deterrence, and in relations with the rest to keep the balance, the China, India, Iran or some European countries. Look, these are just the paradigmical, the classical elements of a realist foreign policy, philosophy and the realist conduct.
