The Arab state that was to be created in Palestine would not be independent,
but would be annexed to the state of Trans-Jordan.
And thus Trans-Jordan would become a big Arab state that
would encompass both sides of the Jordan River.
Since there was a large Arab population within the boundaries
of this Jewish state, particularly in the Galilee,
the Peel report came up with the idea of transferring.
The Arabs of the Galilee, some voluntarily,
and others by coercion to the Arab state.
Arab opposition to the Peel report was complete, with one exception.
The Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan who was to of course,
acquire the Arab part of Palestine, came out in support of the program.
But no other Arabs did.
As for the Jews, they rather grudgingly accepted the British
decision to give them some 20% of Palestine, which on the one hand,
was a historical recognition of the idea of Jewish statehood.
But in only 20% of Palestine, many on the Jewish side, favored rejection.
But in the end, majority of the Jews went along with the partition idea,
most of them believing that this would be a basis for
further discussion with the British when the time came.
The expansion of the borders might come later, but
the British withdrew the idea in 1938, the winds of war were blowing in Europe and
there was a need to placate the Arabs, the Arabs were a much more useful ally for
the British than the Jews who only had their problems to offer.
In early 1939, with no agreement in sight between the Jews and
the Arabs in Palestine, and as the Arab rebellion was grinding to an end,
the British convened a conference in London at the Palace of St.
James, and therefore known as the St. James Conference.
In which the Jews and the Arabs deliberated for
weeks on end with no conclusion, at the end of which, the British issued
a White Paper of their own, that is, a British statement of policy.
And essentially, this British statement of policy
from May 1939, the White Paper of May 1939,
was the final British abandonment of support for the Zionist idea.
The White Paper included three main points,
one was their Jewish immigration to Palestine would be restricted
to 75,000 in the five years ahead, 15,000 a year.
Jewish immigration would only be able to continue thereafter,
that is from 1944 onwards, with Arab consent.
But Arab consent for Jewish immigration would mean, in fact,
that there would be no more Jewish immigration to Palestine.
Land sales were also restricted to those areas where the Jews were already
predominant.
And Palestine was to become independent in ten years time.
What that meant was, that if Jewish immigration would only
continue at fifteen thousand a year until 1944, and
Palestine would become independent in 1949, Palestine would
be an independent Arab state in which the Jews would only be a minority.
That meant, in practice, the end of the Zionist idea.
This independent state in ten year's time was possibly to be part of a greater Arab
federation, so the British thought.
And they would, therefore, be neither a Jewish state nor an Arab state.
But Palestine would be part of a greater Arab federation.
But in such a greater Arab state,
the Jewish minority would be even more inconsequential.
The timing of the White Paper in May 1939, was particularly unfortunate.
The Jewish plight in Europe was worsening from day to day, and as a result,
the White Paper was widely condemned by the opposition in Britain, and
was even rejected by the League of Nations as the lack of British
fulfillment over their mandate over Palestine.
Britain's argument, on the other hand, was that the national home already existed.
They had fulfilled their commitment completely.
There were half a million Jews in Palestine.
There were many Jewish settlements.
A vibrant Jewish community with its political institutions and organizations.
The British, so they argued,
had honestly fulfilled their commitment.
For the Zionists, this was a huge disappointment.
This was an abandonment by the British of the Zionist enterprise, and
the Arab rebellion in Palestine also presented the Zionists with a realization
that what they had ahead of them was a conflict between ideology and reality.
The project as they had hoped was not one of peace, but conflict.
On conflict with the Arabs was inevitable, eventually.
And as a result of that realization, there was some on the Zionist side who
questioned the very right of the Zionist to settle in Palestine and
to continue with the project, if this is what it entailed.
There were those who thought,
that the idea of Jewish statehood should be abandoned.
But for the majority of the Zionists, that was not the conclusion.
And their idea was to prepare for the fight that was certainly to come.
There was no choice but to face this reality, and it was the youth born
in Palestine who would have to follow and execute the policy of confrontation.
Active defense was the homeland style of Jewish defense and self-help.
As opposed to the Jews of the Diaspora, who were more
helpless in their confrontation with their enemies of the exile.
The White Paper, and its abandonment of the Zionist Project,
meant that cooperation with Britain was no longer possible.
And therefore, designers' project as one of evolution,
of graduality made no sense anymore.
There was no time for that.
Time was running out.
The predicament of the Jews in Europe was only getting worse and
British support had come to an end.
It was no longer an evolutionary process that would be satisfactory,
but a revolutionary process.
And a revolutionary process meant that, eventually, there would have to
be an armed confrontation with the Arabs in Palestine and perhaps,
the neighboring Arabs too.
But war was not to be initiated.
War was only to happen when all other options had been exhausted, and
when it was imposed by the other side.
The Jews therefore, at the end of the Arab rebellion had to prepare for
partition and for possible war.
Partition would not bring peace they knew, and therefore,
despite the fact that they were willing to concede on territory,
they realized that this would entail confrontation anyway.