A new kind of equilibrium was now established after the 1973 October war. Both Israel and Egypt, and the Syrians too, were much more acutely aware of their respective limitations. And were therefore willing to engage in agreements that would make war between them a lot less likely. The first agreement after the war was an agreement for The Separation of Forces as it was called along the Canal zone, that was signed between Israel and Egypt in January 1974. Israel withdrew its forces from the Egyptian side of the canal, allowed a certain limited presence of Egyptian forces on the, what was the Israeli side of the canal, and essentially separated the Israeli and Egyptian forces in a way that made the resumption of a war a lot more difficult. The parties also exchanged prisoners, and therefore moved towards a reality in which the Suez Canal could eventually be reopened. And in the creation of a much more peaceful reality between Egypt and Israel in the Suez Canal zone. Negotiations between Israel and Syria were considerably more difficult. But they too ended with a separation of forces agreement between Syria and Israeli in May 1974, where the Israelis withdrew from the territory they had taken from Syria in the recent war, moved back more or less to the lines that had existed after the war of June 1967. And, since that time, May 1974, the Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, has essentially governed the relations between Israel and Syria now for nearly 40 years. There was no separation of forces on the Jordanian front, and one could have or, could have course ask, why should there be one? After all, the Jordanians did not fight along their front, but as we mentioned only sent a limited force to fight on the Syrian front. The Jordanians sought a separation of forces with Israel even though there had been no war between them. And there was no need to disentangle forces that were closely entwined with each other as was the case on the Syrian front or the Egyptian front. The Jordanians sought a separation of forces to have Israel withdraw from the Jordan valley. To create a situation where it would begin to suggest that Israel was beginning to withdraw from the West Bank as part of an agreement that would eventually be signed with Jordan. The idea being that if Israel and Jordan could come to a separation of forces agreement, this would isolate the PLO. It would make Arab recognition of the PLO much less likely, and it would give the impression that Israel was one, was about to give back the West Bank to Jordan in some eventual peace process. But that agreement did not come to fruition. The Israelis regarded the Jordan Valley as an absolutely essential area for their security, and the Israeli government was unwilling to begin a process that could lead to the withdrawal from the West Bank. And, as a result, there was no separation of forces between Israel and Jordan. And therefore the way was paved by that non-agreement to the recognition of the PLO by the Arab states, as we have already seen, as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Israel and Egypt, in September 1975, came to yet another agreement. Which included further withdrawal by Israel from territories in Sinai, creating an agreement between Israel and Egypt that was essentially a non-belligerency agreement. Not yet a peace treaty, but essentially a non-belligerency agreement between Israel and Egypt as Israel was readying itself for a much more serious negotiation with Egypt that would eventually lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. The Egyptians, by signing this agreement with Israel, were taking a much more significant step towards abandoning the conflict with Israel entirely. And this was essentially an important stepping stone towards what became the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.
