8.1.2 The October Surprise - Part 2

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来自 Tel Aviv University 的课程

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

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Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

237 个评分

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

从本节课中

WEEK 4

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 to the present

8.1.1 The October Surprise - Part 16:16

8.1.2 The October Surprise - Part 24:33

8.2.1 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 16:43

8.2.2 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 26:23

8.3 The PLO and the 1982 War in Lebanon3:45

8.4.1 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 15:11

8.4.2 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 26:15

8.5.1 The Oslo Accords - Part 17:17

8.5.2 The Oslo Accords - Part 28:49

8.6 The Jordanian-Israeli Peace6:56

8.7.1 Camp David, 2000 - Part 16:46

8.7.2 Camp David, 2000 - Part 26:55

8.8 Unilateral Disengagement and Further Negotiations10:31

与讲师见面

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

A new kind of equilibrium was now established after the 1973 October war.

Both Israel and Egypt, and the Syrians too,

were much more acutely aware of their respective limitations.

And were therefore willing to engage in agreements

that would make war between them a lot less likely.

The first agreement after the war was an agreement for

The Separation of Forces as it was called along the Canal zone,

that was signed between Israel and Egypt in January 1974.

Israel withdrew its forces from the Egyptian side of the canal,

allowed a certain limited presence of Egyptian forces on the,

what was the Israeli side of the canal, and essentially separated the Israeli and

Egyptian forces in a way that made the resumption of a war a lot more difficult.

The parties also exchanged prisoners, and therefore moved towards

a reality in which the Suez Canal could eventually be reopened.

And in the creation of a much more peaceful reality between Egypt and

Israel in the Suez Canal zone.

Negotiations between Israel and Syria were considerably more difficult.

But they too ended with a separation of forces agreement between Syria and

Israeli in May 1974, where the Israelis withdrew from the territory they

had taken from Syria in the recent war, moved back more or

less to the lines that had existed after the war of June 1967.

And, since that time, May 1974, the Separation of

Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria, has essentially governed

the relations between Israel and Syria now for nearly 40 years.

There was no separation of forces on the Jordanian front, and one could have or,

could have course ask, why should there be one?

After all, the Jordanians did not fight along their front, but

as we mentioned only sent a limited force to fight on the Syrian front.

The Jordanians sought a separation of forces with Israel even though there had

been no war between them.

And there was no need to disentangle forces that were closely entwined with

each other as was the case on the Syrian front or the Egyptian front.

The Jordanians sought a separation of forces

to have Israel withdraw from the Jordan valley.

To create a situation where it would begin to suggest

that Israel was beginning to withdraw from the West Bank

as part of an agreement that would eventually be signed with Jordan.

The idea being that if Israel and Jordan could come to a separation of forces

agreement, this would isolate the PLO.

It would make Arab recognition of the PLO much less likely, and

it would give the impression that Israel was one,

was about to give back the West Bank to Jordan in some eventual peace process.

But that agreement did not come to fruition.

The Israelis regarded the Jordan Valley as an absolutely essential area for

their security, and the Israeli government was unwilling to begin a process

that could lead to the withdrawal from the West Bank.

And, as a result, there was no separation of forces between Israel and Jordan.

And therefore the way was paved by that non-agreement to the recognition of

the PLO by the Arab states, as we have already seen, as the sole,

legitimate representative of the Palestinians.

Israel and Egypt, in September 1975, came to yet another agreement.

Which included further withdrawal by Israel from

territories in Sinai, creating an agreement between Israel and

Egypt that was essentially a non-belligerency agreement.

Not yet a peace treaty, but essentially a non-belligerency agreement between Israel

and Egypt as Israel was readying itself for a much more serious negotiation

with Egypt that would eventually lead to an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

The Egyptians, by signing this agreement with Israel, were taking a much more

significant step towards abandoning the conflict with Israel entirely.

And this was essentially an important stepping stone

towards what became the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

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