8.2.2 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 2

Loading...

来自 Tel Aviv University 的课程

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

258 个评分

Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

258 个评分

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

从本节课中

WEEK 4

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 to the present

8.1.1 The October Surprise - Part 16:16

8.1.2 The October Surprise - Part 24:33

8.2.1 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 16:43

8.2.2 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 26:23

8.3 The PLO and the 1982 War in Lebanon3:45

8.4.1 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 15:11

8.4.2 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 26:15

8.5.1 The Oslo Accords - Part 17:17

8.5.2 The Oslo Accords - Part 28:49

8.6 The Jordanian-Israeli Peace6:56

8.7.1 Camp David, 2000 - Part 16:46

8.7.2 Camp David, 2000 - Part 26:55

8.8 Unilateral Disengagement and Further Negotiations10:31

与讲师见面

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

And it is against this background that Sadat came to the very extraordinary

conclusion that he should take the brave and unprecedented move of making a visit

to Jerusalem to speak to the Israelis directly in their own parliament.

And thus, Sadat arrived in Jerusalem in November 1977 on his historic,

ground-breaking visit to Israel, recognizing Israel and

making this extraordinary gesture of peace with the Jewish state.

But when Sadat appeared in the Israeli Parliament,

in the Knesset in Jerusalem, in his speech,

he made it very clear, that he had not come to Israel for a separate deal.

There had to also be an agreement not only between Israel and the Egyptians.

But Israel also had to make concessions to the Palestinians.

It was important for Sadat, though driven by Egyptian

individual particular interests, it was important for

Sadat not to appear to be abandoning the Palestinians altogether.

And in his speech in the Knesset, Sadat demanded that there be an independent

Palestinian state that Israel fully withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, and

that Israel agree to divide Jerusalem into an Arab

capital of the Palestinian state and the Jewish part as the capital of Israel.

In exchange for his dramatic recognition of Israel, Sadat expected similar dramatic

concessions from the Israeli side but this is not exactly what happened.

The Israeli cabinet seemed to be divided.

Prime Minister Menachem Begin was more reluctant in his agreement for

complete withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula that Egypt demanded.

Then was there foreign minister and the defense minister,

Moshe Dayan and Wrightsman in the Israeli cabinet.

[SOUND] And begging hesitation and concern for

Israel's long-term security, and therefore,

reluctance to commit to complete withdraw almost drove the initiative to failure.

And it was against this possible failure of this historic

initiative that the American president, Jimmy Carter,

convened a conference in September 1978 of Israel, and

Egypt, and the United States to try and bring about a final agreement and

prevent the failure of the Sadat initiative to Israel.

The US role in achieving an agreement between Israel and

the Egyptians was critical.

The parties could accept American ideas more easily than they could accept them

from the other side.

[SOUND] And Israel finally agreed to withdraw fully from

the settlements it had established in the Sinai peninsula

from the airfields that it had built there as well.

And the United States agreed to rebuild the airfields that Israel had

abandoned in Egypt, in Israeli territory,

was considered with US financial and technical assistance.

The United States, also promised an aid package to Egypt.

Egypt, in turn, agreed to supply Israel with oil.

And the final treaty was signed in March 1979

creating full peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel.

The agreement between Israel and Egypt that was achieved at Camp David

did not only relate to Egyptian-Israeli relations.

There was a Palestinian section in the agreement that was achieved

in the Camp David negotiations, and the Palestinian section

dealt with a creation of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

And it is important to note that there was no binding linkage between

the implementation of the Palestinian section, and

the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian section.

That is, failure to achieve agreement on the implementation of the Palestinian

section, did not automatically lead to a breakdown on the Israeli-Egyptian front.

The autonomy talks went nowhere.

Mainly because there were no Palestinians who were really willing to take part

in them.

After all, autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza was not sufficient for the PLO or

for any of the Palestinians who resided in the West Bank and Gaza itself.

And despite the fact that the autonomy talks did not take off,

the treaty between Israel and Egypt held.

What that meant was, that Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel,

had essentially succeeded in trading Sinai for

maintenance of Israeli control over all of Arab-Israel.

[SOUND] Peace with Egypt had great historical meaning.

It dramatically altered the regional balance of power in Israel's favor.

Egypt had now finally departed from the order of battle on the Arab side.

What this meant was, that the Arab states

were not really capable anymore of waging war against Israel.

If Egypt was no longer in the order of battle, Syria or

any other Arab states could not go to war with Israel without Egypt, and

therefore, Egypt at peace with Israel meant that the Arab states we're

no longer capable of realistically thinking in terms of war with Israel.

And, in fact, since the war of 1973,

Israel has not been forced to fight,

any further wars with any of the Arab states.

[SOUND] Although Israel does not fight the Arab states anymore,

the active conflict with the Palestinians continued.

探索我们的目录

免费加入并获得个性化推荐、更新和优惠。

Coursera 致力于普及全世界最好的教育，它与全球一流大学和机构合作提供在线课程。

© 2019 Coursera Inc. 保留所有权利。

通过 App Store 下载

通过 Google Play 获取