And it is against this background that Sadat came to the very extraordinary conclusion that he should take the brave and unprecedented move of making a visit to Jerusalem to speak to the Israelis directly in their own parliament. And thus, Sadat arrived in Jerusalem in November 1977 on his historic, ground-breaking visit to Israel, recognizing Israel and making this extraordinary gesture of peace with the Jewish state. But when Sadat appeared in the Israeli Parliament, in the Knesset in Jerusalem, in his speech, he made it very clear, that he had not come to Israel for a separate deal. There had to also be an agreement not only between Israel and the Egyptians. But Israel also had to make concessions to the Palestinians. It was important for Sadat, though driven by Egyptian individual particular interests, it was important for Sadat not to appear to be abandoning the Palestinians altogether. And in his speech in the Knesset, Sadat demanded that there be an independent Palestinian state that Israel fully withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, and that Israel agree to divide Jerusalem into an Arab capital of the Palestinian state and the Jewish part as the capital of Israel. In exchange for his dramatic recognition of Israel, Sadat expected similar dramatic concessions from the Israeli side but this is not exactly what happened. The Israeli cabinet seemed to be divided. Prime Minister Menachem Begin was more reluctant in his agreement for complete withdrawal of Israel from the Sinai Peninsula that Egypt demanded. Then was there foreign minister and the defense minister, Moshe Dayan and Wrightsman in the Israeli cabinet. [SOUND] And begging hesitation and concern for Israel's long-term security, and therefore, reluctance to commit to complete withdraw almost drove the initiative to failure. And it was against this possible failure of this historic initiative that the American president, Jimmy Carter, convened a conference in September 1978 of Israel, and Egypt, and the United States to try and bring about a final agreement and prevent the failure of the Sadat initiative to Israel. The US role in achieving an agreement between Israel and the Egyptians was critical. The parties could accept American ideas more easily than they could accept them from the other side. [SOUND] And Israel finally agreed to withdraw fully from the settlements it had established in the Sinai peninsula from the airfields that it had built there as well. And the United States agreed to rebuild the airfields that Israel had abandoned in Egypt, in Israeli territory, was considered with US financial and technical assistance. The United States, also promised an aid package to Egypt. Egypt, in turn, agreed to supply Israel with oil. And the final treaty was signed in March 1979 creating full peaceful relations between Egypt and Israel. The agreement between Israel and Egypt that was achieved at Camp David did not only relate to Egyptian-Israeli relations. There was a Palestinian section in the agreement that was achieved in the Camp David negotiations, and the Palestinian section dealt with a creation of autonomy for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. And it is important to note that there was no binding linkage between the implementation of the Palestinian section, and the implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian section. That is, failure to achieve agreement on the implementation of the Palestinian section, did not automatically lead to a breakdown on the Israeli-Egyptian front. The autonomy talks went nowhere. Mainly because there were no Palestinians who were really willing to take part in them. After all, autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza was not sufficient for the PLO or for any of the Palestinians who resided in the West Bank and Gaza itself. And despite the fact that the autonomy talks did not take off, the treaty between Israel and Egypt held. What that meant was, that Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, had essentially succeeded in trading Sinai for maintenance of Israeli control over all of Arab-Israel. [SOUND] Peace with Egypt had great historical meaning. It dramatically altered the regional balance of power in Israel's favor. Egypt had now finally departed from the order of battle on the Arab side. What this meant was, that the Arab states were not really capable anymore of waging war against Israel. If Egypt was no longer in the order of battle, Syria or any other Arab states could not go to war with Israel without Egypt, and therefore, Egypt at peace with Israel meant that the Arab states we're no longer capable of realistically thinking in terms of war with Israel. And, in fact, since the war of 1973, Israel has not been forced to fight, any further wars with any of the Arab states. [SOUND] Although Israel does not fight the Arab states anymore, the active conflict with the Palestinians continued.
