8.4.2 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 2

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来自 Tel Aviv University 的课程

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

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Tel Aviv University

The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part II

256 个评分

This course will discuss the developments in the Middle East from the early 20th century to the present. It will discuss the rise and retreat of Arab nationalism, the problems of internal cohesion of the Arab states, issues of religion and state, and the evolution of Islamist politics. It will also focus on the evolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on the region and will conclude with an in depth analysis of the “Arab Spring” by placing these contemporary revolutionary events in their historical context. Please note that this course builds upon a previous course - The Emergence of the Modern Middle East - Part I (https://www.coursera.org/learn/modern-middle-east-1/home/welcome) Learn about the history of the Middle East for a deeper understanding of current regional developments!

从本节课中

WEEK 4

The escalation and de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1973 to the present

8.1.1 The October Surprise - Part 16:16

8.1.2 The October Surprise - Part 24:33

8.2.1 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 16:43

8.2.2 The Egyptian-Israeli Peace - Part 26:23

8.3 The PLO and the 1982 War in Lebanon3:45

8.4.1 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 15:11

8.4.2 The First Palestinian Intifada - Part 26:15

8.5.1 The Oslo Accords - Part 17:17

8.5.2 The Oslo Accords - Part 28:49

8.6 The Jordanian-Israeli Peace6:56

8.7.1 Camp David, 2000 - Part 16:46

8.7.2 Camp David, 2000 - Part 26:55

8.8 Unilateral Disengagement and Further Negotiations10:31

与讲师见面

Professor Asher Susser
Senior Research Fellow
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies

In November of 1988, the Palestine National Council,

that is the quasi-parliamentary body of the PLO, convened to make

new political decisions, and very much with the Intifada in mind.

And the pressure for change coming from within the West Bank and Gaza.

The PLO made new, historical decisions, and they accepted

two UN resolutions that the Palestinians had never accepted in the past.

The PLO now accepted Resolution 242, and

it also accepted the Partition Resolution of 1947.

Though these resolutions were accepted with all sorts of reservations that

made their interpretation a rather difficult and torturous exercise,

nevertheless the PLO had taken decisions that were a long

step towards the acceptance of the idea of a two state solution.

The albeit qualified acceptance by the PLO of Resolution 242 and

the Partition of 1947, paved the way for

a much greater measure of international recognition of the PLO,

including the willingness of the United States to engage with the PLO.

But that willingness to engage with the PLO did not last for very long.

In the Gulf War of 1990, 91, where Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,

and the United States went to war against Saddam Hussein, Yasser Arafat,

the Chairman of the PLO, took the side of Saddam Hussein.

And having done that disqualified himself in the eyes of the Americans as

a legitimate representative for the Palestinians.

So when the United States initiated the International Conference at

Madrid as the forum for the resumption of the negotiation between Israel and

its Arab neighbors, the PLO was not directly represented there.

The Madrid representation formula for

the Palestinians accepted Palestinians from the West Bank and

Gaza, in the framework of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation,

as the representatives for the Palestinians in the Madrid process.

This was a very unwelcome formula from the PLO's point of view.

The PLO, therefore, made it very clear,

from the very beginning of the Madrid process of late 1991,

that they would not allow the Palestinians, who were representing them,

from the West Bank in Gaza, to actually speak for the Palestinian people.

And the Palestinians who were in the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation could

do very little in the Madrid negotiations without prior approval of the PLO itself.

And eventually, the PLO re-established itself fully as the negotiators on behalf

of the Palestinians without any qualification, by joining Israel in what

became the Oslo surprise, the agreement between Israel and the PLO.

Which essentially allowed the PLO to eclipse the insider leadership

from the West Bank and Gaza and

to fully reestablish itself as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

By negotiating directly with Israel, the PLO was not only eclipsing the internal

leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, but it was also trying to eclipse the Islamic

factor which had emerged in Palestinian politics in the meantime.

For considerable time, there had been a very strong and

impressive showing for the Palestinian Islamic movements

in the student unions of the various universities in the West Bank and Gaza.

And in the Intifada in 1987,

Hamas emerged as the leading Islamist organization amongst the Palestinians.

And the Hamas leadership became a very serious contender

with the PLO for the leadership of the Palestinian people.

And it was far less clear,

as Hamas emerged as a competing leadership with the PLO, exactly who

the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people really was.

While contending with the insider leadership and the competition with Hamas,

the PLO also had to contend with the results of Jordan's decision to

disengage from the West Bank in the summer of 1988.

King Hussein realized that his efforts to maintain some kind of hold

on the future of the Palestinians was not really making much gain.

During the Intifada,

there was considerable expression of anti-Jordanian feeling,

which led the Jordanians to finally decide to disengage formally from the West Bank.

What the Jordanians were saying to the Israelis by disengaging was not that

the Jordanians were completely disinterested in the future of Palestine,

they were not asking to be ignored.

What the Jordanians were saying to the Israelis was that in order to settle

the Palestinian question,

they must also speak to the PLO, not just to the Jordanians.

By pressuring the Israelis to talk to the PLO, the Jordanians were essentially

challenging the PLO to deliver, that is, the Jordanians,

by walking away from the West Bank, were putting the PLO to the test.

Could the PLO really negotiate with the Israelis and lead to change on the ground?

That was the challenge the Jordanians had put to the PLO.

And it was with this challenge that the PLO had to deal in coming to terms with

Israel and proving to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza that the PLO was

indeed capable of delivering a political solution to their predicament.

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