Compatibilism

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来自 The University of Edinburgh 的课程

Introduction to Philosophy

2948 个评分

The University of Edinburgh

Introduction to Philosophy

2948 个评分

這門課程中將向你介紹一些當代哲學的主要研究領域，在每一個領域中將針對一位哲學家，討論他的專業領域中最重要的一些問題及議題。課程將以試圖了解甚麼是哲學開始─其特殊目的和方法，以及哲學和其他學科的差異。接著，我們將會花剩下的課程時間來獲得對哲學不同領域的初步概觀。你將學習的主題包括：知識論─

从本节课中

Do We Have Free Will and Does It Matter?

(Dr. Elinor Mason) We typically feel that the actions that we make are the result of our own free choices. But what if those actions are simply the end result of a long chain of cause and effect? What does this mean for free will? In this module, we'll look at the concept of determinism. In particular, we'll consider the implications that determinism might have for the notion of free will.

Compatibilism7:59

Hard Determinism3:30

与讲师见面

Dr. Dave Ward
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Duncan Pritchard
Professor of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Professor Michela Massimi
Full Professor
Philosophy
Dr. Suilin Lavelle
Lecturer in Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Dr. Matthew Chrisman
Reader in Philosophy
Philosophy
Dr. Allan Hazlett
Dr. Alasdair Richmond
Dr.
Philosophy
Guy Fletcher
Lecturer
Philosophy
Elinor Mason
Senior Lecturer
Philosophy

The next attempt to solve the problem of free will and

determinism is compatibilism.

Compatibilism is the view that although we don't have metaphysical free will,

we are determined.

It doesn't matter.

We nonetheless have moral responsiblity.

We have the thing that matters.

How does this argument work?

Let's start with Hume.

Hume makes a distinction between being free and being constrained.

So he says, we shouldn't contrast being free with being determined, we should

contrast being free with being prevented from doing the things we want to do.

So on Hume's view, we're free when we can follow through on our decisions,

and we're constrained when we're in prison, or

some other way prevented from doing the things we want to do.

So Hume changes the terms of the debate and solves the problem in that way.

What is he's really saying is look we shouldn't be thinking about determinism.

Determinism just is the case and

so there might be a sense of freedom that's opposed to determinism.

But that isn't the interesting sense.

The sense of freedom that we should be interested in is just the totally

ordinary sense of being able to walk around and do what we want to do.

To many this is seemed like a somewhat lame response.

It seems that in changing the subject Hume really has missed the important point.

But I think that there's a really important insight in what Hume says.

And that view is shared with contemporary compatibilists who build on this insight.

The insight is this, what matters is that we decide what to do.

That we are the ones making decisions about our actions,

that's the thing that really matters.

So, here's this argument as it comes from Harry Frankfurt.

In a very famous article, Freedom and the Concept of a Person, published

in 1971 Frankfurt gives an example which philosophers are still discussing today.

Here's a version of that example.

So we mentioned that an evil neuroscientist

has found some way to control Neera's decision making.

And imagine that Neera is about to vote in an election.

If she votes for candidate A, the neuroscientist will intervene and

ensure that she chooses to vote for B.

But if she chooses to vote for B on her own, the neuroscientist won't intervene.

So let's imagine that Neera does decide to vote for B, she makes the decision

on her own, that's what she does, the neuroscientist doesn't intervene.

What do we think about Neera's responsibility?

Most of us would say, she's responsible.

That was her own decision.

And that's where Frankfurt says, aha you see.

It doesn't matter that she didn't have any ultimate possibilities.

It didn't matter that that's the only thing that she could do.

The only thing that matters in this situation is that Neera,

in fact, made her own decision.

So again, the general point here is that making

your own mind up because of your own reasons is what makes you responsible.

It's not the fact that you could have done something else.

And so, Frankfurt's point is determinism doesn't matter.

Maybe it's true that we can't do anything other than what we do, but

if we decide to do that.

On our own, that's enough to make us responsible.

Here's another version of that argument, this one from Peter Strawson.

Strawson points out that as we go about the world engaging in

ordinary interpersonal relationships,

we react to people on the basis of what we perceive to be their motivations.

We react to them on the basis of what we think is their quality of will

as Strawson puts it.

What we think they're up to.

Are they trying to hurt us?

Are they trying to help us?

And it's on the basis of those thoughts that we praise or blame them, or

resent them, or whatever it is.

Strawson's point is that it doesn't really matter where their quality of will,

where their motivations comes from.

In particular, it doesn't matter if those motivations are determined.

What matters is that we think people have those motivations and

that we continue to react to them with what Strawson calls

the reactive attitudes, things like resentment and gratitude.

These are an essential part of our interpersonal relationships,

says Strawson, and these abstract questions about determinism.

Just don't matter.

What matters is that somebody really is trying to hurt us, for example.

Strawson makes this clear by talking about excuses.

He points out that to have an excuse is to not have done the thing we think you did,

so to not have been trying to hurt, if we say, I wasn't trying to hurt you.

I was blown by the wind, then we let the person off the hook.

We say, in that case, I don't blame you.

So Strawson points out that that kind of excuse

doesn't generalize to the case of determinism.

We can't say I wasn't trying to hurt you, I was determined.

You were still trying to hurt me.

It's just that you may have been determined to do so.

But, the bit that matters Strawson says is the trying to hurt bit.

So that's how Strawson developed Hume's insight.

The thing that really matters is the actual quality of our motivations,

not where they come from.

The objection that we might give to a compatibilism of this sort is the same

objection that applies to Hume.

Which is just isn't changing the subject.

We started to looking for free will and

now you're giving us something a little bit different.

You're saying well, we can still react to each other in these ways and that's fine.

But we might just say, look that's not what we wanted.

These reactions aren't justified if determinism is true.

So we seem to have a problem here.

Strawson, Frankfurt, Hume are telling us just focus on motivations.

Just focus on the way person is, but that's not where we started.

What we started with was wanting to know if people are free.

Let me summarize what I've said so far about compatibilism.

Compatibilists say that there are features of our acts, the way that we behave,

the way that we are, that matter.

And they matter to moral responsibility.

And they matter even if we don't have metaphysical free will.

The worry about that is that it doesn't go deep enough.

It's offering us a pale shadow of what we were looking for

when we started looking for free will.

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