A verification mechanism is an important part of any nuclear arms control agreement.
Verification help to maintain a certain level of
mutual trust which is absolutely necessary to make the regime effective.
The absence of this trust,
the absence of verification,
may undermine the sustainability of
a regime even in the situation when nobody want to break this regime.
This is what happens, for example,
with implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces signed in 1987.
There are many mutual accusations issued by Russia and
the United States concerning the compliance of all the obligations of INF Treaty.
One article of the INF Treaty says that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
And that means that when
the United States and the Soviet Union were developing the text of the treaty,
they thought that the treaty will be enforced forever.
Details and very effective mechanism of verification was also established.
All procedures were written and included into the treaty.
But the problem is that this verification mechanism was working only until 2001.
After that, both sides could only rely on their national technical means of verification.
But the problem is that,
using only national technical means,
it is impossible to verify
completely the compliance of the opposite side with the obligations.
For example, the United States experts believe that Russia designed, produced,
and deployed a ground-based,
ground-launched cruise missile with a range of more than 500 kilometers,
and this is a violation of the treaty obligations.
But Americans cannot prove that because according to the treaty, I quote,
"The range capability of a GLCM shall be considered to be the maximum distance
which can be covered by the missile in
its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion."
So, without having access to the testing site and access to the missile,
Americans cannot check whether this missile was fully loaded with fuel,
and what distance this missile could fly being fully loaded with this fuel.
Using only national technical means,
this is impossible to verify.
The same time, Russia also has some doubts that Americans fully
comply with their obligations according to the INF Treaty.
For example, when the United States decided to
deploy one of the elements of Ballistic Missile Defense System in Europe,
they did it by deploying a sea-based system on land.
But the problem is that this sea-based system can launch not only interceptors,
not only anti-ballistic missile interceptors,
but also cruise missiles with a range of more than 500 kilometers.
American says that this system,
this launching system cannot be used to launch
cruise missiles because there are no certain guiding systems et cetera,
but Russian technical means cannot verify that.
This is why this situation,
the absence of inspections on verification,
undermine the relevance and
the very existence of the Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Forces.
The evolution of the system of verification
from START I to the New START is an interesting case.
This case can help us to understand how
general circumstances influence the shape of the system of verification.
START I was signed and
ratified in the period when the Cold War was just over,
and the level of mutual trust was not so high.
This is why both sides tried to establish
a really effective and detailed system of verification
which proved to be a bit too complicated and expensive later.
Besides national technical means,
both sides could use a wide spectrum of different means.
For example, on-site inspections,
each side could conduct various types
of inspections on the territory of the opposite side.
They could place their control systems directly on some objects of
the opposite side to verify and to check how many missiles,
for example, the opposite side will produce.
When Russia and the United States were testing their missiles,
they were obliged to exchange specific information
which gives an opportunity to check the characteristics of the tested missiles.
It is called telemetry.
Both sides also could add to that list some additional measures agreed on the basis
of mutual agreement and on the basis of cooperation.
There were also some types of activities which were allowed to conduct when
one side have some suspicions concerning the activity of the opposite side.
So this system was really effective,
and the system was working during all the period when START I one was in force.
The system of verification,
according to START I,
included up to 15 types of various inspections, 15 just types.
The full list of these types,
you can see on the slide.
There were some very specific types of inspections.
For example, post-dispersal inspections meant that
when Russian Nuclear Strategic Forces conduct exercises and,
during these exercises, the mobile complexes,
the mobile launching systems are dispersed over some territory,
Americans could verify that,
after the end of these exercises,
all the complexes are returned to the main base.
So you see, some types of inspections were very,
very specific, and they could verify only one certain type of activity.
There were also 152 types of notifications which both sides
had to make to inform the opposite sides about
their activities in the sphere of strategic nuclear forces.
This system of verification appeared to be very complicated, excessively complicated,
very expensive, and after some time
clearly unnecessary, especially for Russia.
Even long before the START I expired,
Russian experts regarded this system as a burden for Russia.
In the period when illusions about possible cooperation,
strategic partnership with the United States disappeared,
Russian militaries didn't want Americans to check every step of Russian nuclear forces.
At that time, Russia was developing new systems
and plans to develop new systems in the future.
So Russian experts thought that
these detailed mechanisms of American control over the development of
Russian nuclear forces undermined strategic stability
and is undermining Russian national security interests.
In 2009, 2010, when Russia and the United States conducted
new negotiations on the New START Treaty,
both sides agreed to make the new system of verification more flexible,
less expensive, and more simple.
Americans agreed to make this system more simple too.
So, finally both sides managed to
elaborate an agreement concerning the new system of verification.
According to the new agreement,
each side has a right to conduct no more than 18 inspections a year,
and there are only two types of inspections.
And there were 42 types
of notifications instead of 152 in START I.
There is no permanent monitoring on
production facilities where nuclear missiles are produced.
There are some also limitations on the exchange of telemetry.
From Russia's point of view,
this system can guarantee mutual transparency,
and support mutual trust
and confidence that the opposite side's complying with the obligations.
But the same time,
this system is not excessive and can provide for the development,
and the development of transparency,
and maintenance of bilateral regime.
