In this course, Peter Kenez, Professor Emeritus at UC Santa Cruz, explains the events of modern Russian history and introduces its most significant actors—from Vladimir Lenin to Vladimir Putin.
Putin's Foreign Policy
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来自 University of California, Santa Cruz 的课程
Russian History: from Lenin to Putin
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从本节课中
Reform, Stagnation, Collapse, Rebirth?
与讲师见面
Peter KenezProfessor Emeritus
History
In the course of the 1990s,
Russia's role in the world politics was greatly diminished of NATO,
which came into existence in order to resist Soviet expansionism,
came to include the various countries
of Eastern Europe which had been part of the Warsaw Pact.
The Warsaw Pact which came into existence as a very ineffectual opponent of NATO.
It's not only the Warsaw Pact now has disappeared, dissolved,
but the countries which had been included
in the Warsaw Pact now seem came to be part of NATO.
It seems seems, that though the evidence is not perfect,
that Gorbachev was promised that NATO would not
expand to include these countries.
But nonetheless, that is what happened.
From the Russian point of view,
the expansion of NATO could serve no other purpose,
than to keep Russia in check.
Russian foreign policy in in the Yeltsin era and in
the first years of the Putin era was the was European oriented.
This seemed natural to the Russian leader,
and Putin was some among among the first who expressed condolences
over 09/11 for understandable reasons.
In as much as Islamic adventurism,
Islamic threat was as great for Russia than to any other country.
Given the fact that Russia included has today
a very large Muslim population in the Caucasus and also in the murrow Ural Mountains.
And the radicalization of that population is a major threat.
However, during the Putin era,
the Russian state, Putin himself perceived increasing threats coming from the west.
The threat presented itself.
First, because Putin rightly regarded the best,
in particular to the United States as a subversive force.
Subversive in the sense that the United States supported various coup accounts,
which were carried out against authoritarian regimes,
which is such as the one in the Ukraine,
such as ultimately in Libya,
in Iraq, most notably.
And the possibility of American support for a coup against Putin's authoritarian rule,
rule could not be excluded.
And also, the West,
Western Europe but in particular the United States by its very nature,
by its very existence,
existence is a subversive threat.
So, the consequence was that
the Russian leadership made one after another steps,
steps in order to diminish this possibilities
by not allowing independent organisations
which received support from the West to operate.
And in that sense,
cut Russia once again off from the Western world.
world Making making it more difficult for people to get visas,
not allowing independent organizations to receive funds from the west.
The Well, the goal of Russian foreign policy must have
been first of all, to ensure security.
And the security meant,
the increased danger as it was perceived by
the Russians on their most sensitive western border.
That is the The state states
which exist in the western borders such as the Baltic states,
such such as Poland in particular,
were viscerally anti Russian anti-Russian.
Now, maybe there are good historical reasons why these people have feelings,
negative feelings about Russia.
But the fact is,
that if these countries receive western support in the terms of western armament,
Russians and not only Putin,
but the Russians in general perceived these as threat to their own security.
Now, the ironic consequence is that these states,
particularly the Baltic states and Poland are concerned about of Russian aggression.
And therefore, demand asked for western support,
western military support including armaments.
But it seems to me that by this very fact of acquiring such support,
they make this area much more unstable and much less secure.
Not not only to Russia but also to themselves.
Well, the two great crisis crises which occurred, first one,
in Georgia in 2008,
and then of course,
much more significantly in the Ukraine in 2014.
In Georgia, the situation was that
the revolution carried out which overthrew the regime,
and the new President Saakashvili who came into office received western support,
and Georgia asked for being admitted to NATO.
This was perceived by by the Russians as a security threat.
Now, when the Georgian administration by that the time Saakashvili was out of office,
attempted to put down a region which
had a degree of autonomy because it was inhabited by an indigenous group,
and the Georgians came to occupy this small area, Ossetia.
Russia had that casus belli,
in a few days defeated the Georgian army.
It They did not actually occupy Georgia,
they did not heard invade,
but however satisfied, declaring this minor state as an independent entity.
Apozitia Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia became
independent states recognized by no one
except those who were partisans of Russia in the international scheme.
But the real reason that Russia during
the Medvedev administration took such a step was because of the threat
that Georgia might be joining NATO and
the Russians demonstrated that they would not accept that.
Ukraine, of course, it's a far more significant situation.
The Ukraine which existed in the first 15 years
of both Soviet era was in in-between area,
in which the Western Ukrainians had different political commitments,
different histories, different economic interests than those who lived in the East.
And economically, Ukraine was not successful.
The degree of corruption,
if anything was greater even than in Russia itself.
Of itself, standard of living was worse than in Russia.
The yearly per capita income in the Ukraine was way
below that of Russian per capita income.
Politically, what was happening,
that was a kind of agreement between East and West.
The presidents who were elected interestingly alternated one from the west,
one from the east, representing different set of
the population and pursuing different policies to the extent that,
for example, the president who was elected from the West
made a guerrilla chief, Bandera,
who fought against Russians during the Second World War as a national hero.
And when the president who was elected from the east,
Yanukovych, and all that.
And Bandera now, was not a national hero again.
Presidents who were elected from the west made it unlawful to deny that
the great famine of the 1930s
was a conscious attempt by the Russians to punish the Ukrainians.
And then when Yanukovych from east came into office,
he annulled this particular historical revisionism.
So it is fair to say that the Ukraine,
it was something of a compromise.
The Ukraine, something which stood in between the west and in the east,
which was acceptable from the Russian point of view.
One could say that the Ukraine was obviously a state,
a sovereign state, but was not a nation.
The degree of differences
in outlook from the East and the West were very great indeed,
especially in the region, Galicia,
which traditionally not been part of Russia and been part of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and acquired in Russia only after the Second World War,
where Ukrainian nationalism, really the birthplace of Ukrainian nationalists of
going back to the 19th century was for understandable reasons, directed against Russia.
And, consequently, to be a Ukrainian nationalist primarily meant
that you were anti-Russian, viscerally anti-Russian.
And then came this historical moment in
which Yanukovych negotiated an agreement with Western Europe,
in which he would receive credit and he would have to carry out anti-corruption reforms,
or reforming the Ukrainian economy.
This was perceived by the Putin administration as something of a threat, namely ties,
the economic ties between Ukraine and Russia where,
of course, well, a demand.
And consequently, the Russian response,
Putin's response, was to offer more money,
15 billion euros in
order to persuade Yanukovych to go back on his agreement with the west.
And it was that particular moment when Yanukovych went back on
his previous agreement that demonstrations occurred in the Maidan,
that is a central square in Kiev,
which ultimately made Yanukovych to run away,
to go into exile into Russia.
Now, at that time,
Yanukovych would have been willing to agree to carry out a plebiscite,
a new election, and it was clear that he would not win that election,
nonetheless, the Western Ukrainians would not agree to this.
The Western Europe, the Western Ukrainians,
received support from the West which encouraged them to resist,
and consequently,
the Ukrainian Civil War started.
The Ukrainian Civil War,
which commenced, was a great tragedy for everyone involved.
Of course, primary, is a tragedy for the Ukraine.
Russia's involvement is self-evident.
For Russia to have a hostile Ukraine on their western border is a major security threat.
Ukraine made it clear that in 2017,
when the agreement of Russia's renting Sevastopol naval base,
which is the only Russian naval base on the Black Sea, would not be renewed.
Russian response was to take over Crimea.
This was a relatively easy operation,
in as much as the Ukrainian minority in the Crimea was actually quite small.
Whatever opposition there was,
came actually from the Tatar minority,
who were more anti-Russian than anti-Ukrainian.
Of course, we should remember that Crimea came to be attached to Ukraine only in 1954,
and that came about when Khrushchev wanted mark the 300th anniversary of Ukraine
joining Russia by this act
of giving to the Ukraine the Crimea,
which at that time,
as long as the Soviet Union existed,
was a perfectly harmless,
meaningless concession, which are only ceremony of consequences.
But the Crimea has not been
ethnically Ukrainian then or after.
But I think that the major reason for Putin to take this act was the threat to
the naval base which Sevastopol has been a Russian city for a long time.
Now, it seems that there would be a civil war in the Ukraine even if Putin,
the Russians, would keep altogether a law.
Eastern Ukrainian, those who live in the east and those who live in the west,
have reason to dislike one another.
The Western Ukrainians, who claim to want to join Europe,
desire to join Europe not because of
their deep held commitments to liberal values as they perceive Europe represents,
but because of their Russophobian as
their desire for getting help against what they perceive as the aggressive Russia.
The irony is that the Russians seem to
be on the losing side in almost every international issue.
And the more they are on the losing side, the West,
especially American policy makers,
perceive Russia as ever more aggressive.
Now, the Ukrainian civil war could have
a very sensible conclusion
by the Ukraine agreeing of transforming the state into a federal state.
That clearly would be acceptable for
the Eastern Ukrainians and also for the Putin administration.
The West, however, is resisting this notion of,
in effect, breaking up the unity of the Ukraine.
Breaking up, not in the sense of forming an independent Eastern Ukraine that really,
this is not in the cards, but simply,
given a degree of autonomy in economic and even in foreign policy to the Eastern Europe,
Eastern Ukrainians, which they desire.
Now, American response and really,
the policy is really made in the United States rather than in Western Europe,
is to punish Russia,
which the Obama administration perceived as Russian aggression, by imposing sanctions.
Now, it has always been very difficult to understand
the purpose of those sanctions because the idea that
this will influence Russian behavior is far-fetched.
It's very difficult to imagine that now,
the Russians are going to behave differently in order to show
themselves according to western evaluations that they behave well.
This is not going to happen,
and this should be perfectly clear to everyone.
This is not going to happen.
So what is the consequence of these sanctions?
It's to impoverish Russian further.
Now, is this in American interests to make Russians more miserable than they already are?
It seems to me; this is not in fact the case.
Western interests should be helping to develop the Russian middle class,
a segment of society which would be a supporter of liberal ideas and liberal values,
and would demand to be treated as independent birth by citizens by their state.
The impoverishment of Russia does not serve their purpose.
